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ABSTRACT 
A threat assessment model to identify domestic radical groups on a 
trajectory towards terrorist violence remains an elusive goal.  The lack of a model 
constrains proactive counter-terrorism efforts resulting in largely reactive 
strategies that often are ineffectual in discovering and disrupting terrorist plots 
while in an inchoate stage.  The Path to Terrorist Violence Model, based on a 
threat assessment model used in the emerging field of threat management for 
the judiciary and elected officials, is a valid and reliable assessment methodology 
to identify radical groups at risk of escalation to acts of terrorism.  By focusing on 
attack-related behaviors that a group must take to mount a planned terrorist 
attack, the Path to Terrorist Violence avoids contentious issues related to 






































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW................................................................ 1 
II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS................................................................ 7 
A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 9 
1. The Path to Terrorist Violence Construct ............................ 13 
B. SUMMARY......................................................................................... 24 
III. TESTING THE FIT: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THREE GROUPS .......... 27 
A. GROUP ONE: HISTORIC LEFTIST RADICAL GROUP.................... 28 
1. Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)..................................... 28 
2. The SLA Path to Terrorist Violence...................................... 32 
3. Analysis.................................................................................. 33 
B. GROUP TWO: CONTEMPORARY SINGLE ISSUE GROUP............ 34 
1. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF)....................................... 34 
2. The ALF Path to Terrorist Violence...................................... 37 
3. Analysis.................................................................................. 40 
C. GROUP THREE: CONTEMPORARY RIGHT WING GROUP ........... 41 
1. The Army of God (AOG) ........................................................ 41 
2. The AOG Path to Terrorist Violence..................................... 44 
3. Analysis.................................................................................. 46 
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS..................................................... 47 
IV. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................ 49 
A. THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR THE PATH TO TERRORIST 
VIOLENCE ......................................................................................... 52 
1. Sprinzak - Crisis of Legitimacy............................................. 52 
2. Smith - Value References in Group Rhetoric ...................... 53 
3. Post, Ruby and Shaw - Integrated Analysis Approach....... 53 
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH .................... 55 
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................ 55 
1. Support of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)........................... 55 
2. Integration with other Methodologies: Atypical Signal 
Analysis and Processing (ASAP) ......................................... 56 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 59 

































                                           
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
A valid and reliable threat assessment model to identify domestic radical 
groups on a trajectory towards terrorist violence remains an elusive goal.  The 
difficulty in identifying groups at risk stems in part from the complexity and 
idiosyncratic nature of the “causal chain” that leads to the commission of acts of 
terrorism (Crenshaw 1995, 5).  Because terrorism appears in a variety of forms 
shaped by government counter terrorism efforts, religious traditions that influence 
ideology, historical experiences and culture, attempts to assess the threat 
potential of radical groups based on psychosocial indicators have yielded less 
than satisfactory results (Weinberg 1991, 426).  The resulting lack of an 
assessment model constrains proactive domestic counter-terrorism efforts 
resulting in largely reactive strategies that often are ineffectual in discovering and 
disrupting terrorist plots while in an inchoate stage.  
Operationally, the lack of an assessment model makes it difficult for law 
enforcement to differentiate between benign groups and ones that might evolve 
toward acts of terrorism.  This dilemma hamstrings criminal intelligence1 efforts to 
balance the competing demands of preventing terrorist violence while respecting 
fundamental civil liberties.  Historically, this dilemma led to widespread abuses of 
civil liberties by government intelligence agents in the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
including spying on, and occasionally disrupting, constitutionally protected 
political activity and infringing on freedoms of association, assembly and 
expression (Halperin et al. 1976, 25; Bouza 1968, 19; Donnor 1990, 150). 
A partial answer may lie in applying an existing threat assessment model, 
called the Path to Violence (PTV), to domestic radical groups at risk of escalation 
to terrorist violence.  The majority of terrorist groups have enough shared 
characteristics to permit some generalization (Sprinzak 1991, 52).  While terrorist 
 
1. Criminal Intelligence is defined as the collection of data for analysis to determine if it: (1) is relevant 
to the identification of criminal activity, including terrorism, engaged in by an individual or an organization 
reasonably suspected of involvement in illegal activity, and (2) meets criminal intelligence system 
submission criteria.  Such information includes narcotics manufacturing and/or trafficking, unlawful 
gambling, extortion, infiltration of legitimate businesses for illegitimate purposes, organized crime, threats 
to public officials and private citizens and terrorism (Thomas 2000, 129; FBI 2005a). 
2 
groups may differ in identity and group psychology, they all share a common 
structural genealogy that sets them apart from groups that do not resort to acts of 
terrorism.  For example, most of the known organizations have been splinter 
groups of larger radical movements with many reaching the decision to resort to 
terrorist violence gradually through a process of radicalization (Sprinzak 1991, 
52; Laqueur 1997, 45; Gurr 1973, 87).  This commonality may allow comparison 
among and between radical groups and allow threat assessment using PTV 
concepts. 
The Path to Violence construct, elaborated on in the next chapter, has 
yielded a threat assessment model used in the emerging field of threat 
management involving targeted or planned violence against elected officials and 
the judiciary (Calhoun 2001, 5; Calhoun and Weston 2003, 35).  Targeted 
violence is a subset of intended violence defined as a very specific symbolic 
choice of individual, location, or physical structure such as public officials, public 
figures, courthouses, schools, shopping centers, churches and synagogues, 
abortion clinics and animal vivisection laboratories (Calhoun 2001, 57).  The PTV 
focuses on attack-related behaviors in six sequential steps that an attacker must 
take to mount a planned attack.  By identifying and describing the behaviors 
necessary to commit an assassination, researchers offered a viable assessment 
model to recognize potential attackers prior to the act of violence.   
Once inspired to violence, the behaviors and actions of an attacker appear 
remarkably similar regardless of the target.  The apparent universality of the PTV 
construct enables the study of violence in its different manifestations, including 
domestic radical groups at risk of escalation.  The hypothesis of this research is 
that the PTV model, and its attendant actions, can be applied to the assessment 
of radical groups at risk of escalation to terrorist violence.  Because the PTV 
concept relies on universal behaviors linking all forms of intended violence, the 
examples provided later in this research are drawn from an array of violent 
episodes and targets.   
3 
The genesis of the PTV concept is traceable to research on Presidential 
assassins conducted by the United States Secret Service in the late 1990’s (Fein 
and Vossekuil 1999, 248).  Entitled the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), 
this work entailed detailed research into the lives and activities of 83 assassins 
and near-assassins.  Its major finding is that many, if not most, attacks on public 
officials and public figures are potentially preventable.  Individuals intending to 
attack follow paths to violence indicated by attack-related behaviors (Borum, et 
al. 1999, 340).   
Researchers avoided problems inherent in previous studies that often 
relied on secondary sources and questionable methodology.  Project researchers 
bypassed tenuous and invalid race, psychology and trait-based assumptions to 
focus on the assassin's actions (Fein et al. 1995, 58).  They concluded that 
assassination must be understood as a process composed of incremental 
behaviors in which all of an attacker’s actions are intertwined (Borum, et al. 1999, 
340).  The attacker moves from embracing the idea that violence is an 
acceptable solution through various steps to committing the violent act.  Seeing 
the requisite behaviors in sequence strengthens analysis and the ability to 
identify movement towards violence.   
The process is best envisioned as a path leading to violence, or for the 
purposes of this research, a Path to Terrorist Violence (PTTV).  In the same 
manner as the PTV, by focusing on radical groups at risk looking for specific 
attack-related activities, it may be possible to determine whether a group is on 
the Path to Terrorist Violence and is moving towards the commission of terrorist 
acts.  If the PTTV works in the same way as the PTV, then groups intending to 
commit terrorist violence engage in certain noticeable behaviors.  Terrorism as 
intended violence is a process of behaviors, or a path, along which a radical 
group can move in either direction reaching one level and then moving forward or 
retreating to a previous level.  Time is essentially irrelevant along the path; 
traveling the PTTV can take months or years, or it can be traversed in hours 
(Calhoun and Weston 2004, 58).  
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The PTTV concept is elaborated on in the next chapter.  It can be 
envisioned as a stairway consisting of six steps.  Step One is the existence of a 
Grievance.  Frustration with efforts to redress a group’s grievance evolves into 
Step Two, Ideation, revolving around the consideration of violence as a means to 
achieve an objective.  In this regard, the PTTV model is useful in identifying 
group activity as well as lone individuals or small groups acting independently 
following the concept of leaderless resistance.2  With Step Three, Research & 
Planning, the threshold of observability and criminal activity is crossed as group 
members engage in conspiratorial, inchoate offenses.  This step is significant 
because it forces a group out into the open to gather intelligence on the targeted 
individual or facility, conduct surveillance and make inquiries - all actions that are 
potentially noticeable.  In addition, as described below, once a crime has been 
committed law enforcement can employ more intrusive, and oftentimes more 
effective, criminal intelligence techniques to identify the scope of group activities.  
In Step Four, Preparation, activities such as obtaining a disguise, preparing a 
weapon or buying ammunition continue the escalation to violence and constitute 
noticeable behaviors.  Breaching constitutes Step Five and consists of attempts 
to bypass security, rehearsals, and dry runs.  Delivering the act of violence in 
Step Six, Attack, culminates the trip on the PTTV and includes assaulting the 
target with a weapon, firebombing, committing acts of vandalism or other 
violence.   
Because the PTTV focuses on conduct, rather than relying on less reliable 
and controversial psychosocial or race-based profiles of potential attackers, the 
model meshes well with restrictions on criminal intelligence activities.  These 
restrictions, stemming largely from prior abuses during police intelligence 
activities, require the existence of reasonable suspicion – a criminal predicate - 
that an individual or organization is involved in a definable criminal activity or 
enterprise before intrusive law enforcement strategies, such as surveillance, 
infiltration, and disruption are employed (Thomas 2000, 26).   
 
2. Leaderless resistance is defined as “…voluntary, individual or small group independent cell criminal 
actions motivated by, and in furtherance of the stated goals of a political organization or movement.”  
Groups following this model include right wing and animal rights extremists (Kaplan 1997, 80). 
5 
Identifying terrorism potential using the PTV model serves complementary 
goals.  First, it minimizes the expenditure of finite law enforcement resources on 
unnecessary investigations of groups not posing a threat.  Second, it minimizes 
the potential chilling effect on, and infringement of, constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of association, expression and dissenting political activity caused by 
unwarranted police investigation and disruption of benign groups.  Third, in many 
cases, PTTV analysis can be accomplished using open sources, such as Internet 
web sites, press releases, group propaganda and proclamations, statements and 
interviews of leaders and key supporters.  Open source information often yields 
radical group grievances, ideation and intentions – all potentially useful indicators 
in PTTV analysis.  The use of open sources is non-intrusive and does not violate 
restrictions on criminal intelligence activities because such information is in the 
public domain.   
The goal of this thesis is to test the applicability of the PTTV concept as a 
terrorism threat assessment tool by applying it to three groups representative of 
the broad spectrum of domestic radical groups.  The first is the now-defunct 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a left wing, urban terrorist group active in 
California in the early 1970’s.  The SLA is famous for the kidnapping of 
newspaper heiress Patty Hearst, numerous violent robberies and a bloody 
shootout with the Los Angeles, CA police (McClellan and Avery 1977).  The 
second is the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), a contemporary extremist animal 
rights group classified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a terrorist 
group for its arson and vandalism attacks on animal research and especially 
vivisection laboratories (FBI 2004b).  The third is the Army of God (AOG), part of 
the somewhat amorphous and loosely coupled anti-abortion movement that 
includes radical groups like Lambs of Christ and Missionaries to the Pre-born 





                                           
Presbyterian minister Paul Hill who was executed by the State of Florida for the 
1994 assassination of Dr. David Gunn and an escort outside a Pensacola, FL 
abortion clinic.   
This thesis has utility for counter-terrorism efforts including law 
enforcement and the broader goal of homeland security as well as for policy 
makers and legislators seeking insight into the evolution of radical groups 
towards terrorist violence as a tactic to achieve group objectives.  The bombing 
of the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City in 1996 by homegrown terrorists 
was the most deadly act of domestic terrorism3 prior to the multi-focal attacks on 
9/11.  The danger of a myopic focus on transnational terrorism, especially the 
Islamist variety, may result in insufficient attention to the threat posed by 
domestic radical groups.  In the ten years following the bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building, the radical right has spawned sixty terrorist plots ranging from 
plans to bomb government buildings, banks, clinics, synagogues, mosques and 
bridges, to assassinating police officers, judges and elected officials, to robbing 
banks, and armored cars and procuring illegal machine guns, missiles, 
explosives, biological and chemical weapons (Blejwas et al. 2005, 32).  This 
research helps to push the focus of counter-terrorism efforts outwards to 
embrace a variety of potential threats to include those posed by domestic groups.   
 
 
3. The FBI defines domestic terrorism as “…the unlawful or threatened use of violence by a group or 
individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign direction, 
committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (ROCIC 2004, 2). 
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II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The genesis of the Path to Violence (PTV) concept is traceable to 
research on presidential assassins by James W. Clarke (1981, 84). Clarke 
deviated from traditional attempts to identify an assassin profile or to decipher the 
psychopathology of a perpetrator’s mind.  His research led to the realization that 
determining what was in the mind of the assassin would not yield a viable threat 
assessment method.  He was the first to recognize the utility of a "situational 
approach to predicting political dangerousness” by noting behaviors and actions 
common to the assassins he studied (1981, 90).  By focusing on actions integral 
to an assassin's behavior, Clarke shifted the focus from speculating about what 
was in the mind of the assassin to examining what a suspected assassin was 
doing.  He showed that potential assassins could be identified by what they did, 
not by their irrationality or mental illness. 
Almost two decades later, Clarke’s research was bolstered by the findings 
of the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) of the United States Secret 
Service (Fein and Vossekuil 1999, 248).  The project entailed detailed research 
into the lives and activities of 83 assassins and near-assassins.  The major 
overall finding is that many, if not most, attacks on public officials are potentially 
preventable.  Assassins follow paths to their attacks engaging in "attack-related" 
behaviors (Fein and Vossekuil, 1999, 238).  Project researchers found that 
tenuous race, psychology and trait-based indicators were not useful indicators of 
violence.  They bypassed these assumptions to focus on the assassin's actions 
and concluded that assassination is best understood as a process composed of 
incremental behaviors (Borum, et al. 1999, 340).  The study found:  
Persons intending to mount attacks follow paths to their attacks.  
They often engage in… discernible activities that precede an 
attack.  They may demonstrate interest in previous assassins and 
assassination attempts.  They are likely to communicate their 
intentions to others or to keep a journal or diary about their thinking 
and activities. (Fein and Vossekuil 1999, 332) 
 
8 
The PTV model, while originally conceived as applying to lone assassins 
targeting high profile protectees, like the President of the United States, can be 
applied to other forms of targeted violence.  Its concepts can be used in threat 
assessments of radical groups at risk of escalation to acts of terrorist violence.  
Applied as the Path to Terrorist Violence (PTTV) threat assessment model, it can 
be used to identify groups posing a risk of terrorist violence.  As a proactive 
assessment tool, the PTTV can be used to identify precursor activities indicative 
of plots to commit terrorist violence enabling counter terrorism forces to disrupt 
conspiracies before violence occurs. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the PTTV model turn on the concept of 
intended violence.  Not all violence is the same; opportunistic violence may be a 
form of entertainment for a criminal offender or pursued as an outlet for their 
frustration.  Examples include vandalism, purse snatch robbery, assault and 
violence towards particular cultures or races.  Expressive or impromptu violence 
is spontaneous and unplanned (Calhoun 2001, 72).  It often stems from some 
kind of interpersonal altercation in which one person intends to harm another.  
Those involved typically know each other, are similar in age and frequently share 
the same race and ethnic background (Hollinger et al. 1994, 210).  By contrast, 
intended violence is premeditated and motive driven, such as the desire to 
acquire property or, in the case of terrorism, to achieve a political end.  Typically, 
those involved do not know one another and the harm caused is secondary to 
the motive (Berkowitz 1994, 89).   
The elements of premeditation and planning differentiate intended 
violence from other forms such as opportunistic or impromptu violence.  While the 
degree of planning involved is infinitely variable and ranges from elaborate to 
simple, planning is an essential step in all intended violence. The degree of 
complexity often is determined by factors such as the setting for the attack, the 
target's accessibility, and the assailant's attitude toward escaping.  The 
universality of premeditation and planning makes this type of violence amenable 
to threat assessment because the violence is theoretically detectable 
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before it occurs.  Obviously, a disciplined and devoted group that is well versed 
in tradecraft,4 such as strict compartmentalization, communications discipline and 
covert activity, will be difficult to detect.   
In this thesis the terms “intended violence” and “targeted violence” are 
synonymous and refer to the choice of a symbolic individual, location or physical 
structure as the target for attack.  Such targets include public officials, public 
figures, abortion providers, courthouses, schools, shopping centers, churches 
and synagogues, abortion clinics and animal vivisection laboratories, among 
others.  Targeted violence as terrorist acts differs only in motivation from the 
other variants of intended violence. 
Terrorism involves targets that are chosen because they are symbolic or 
capable of influencing a larger population beyond those immediately affected by 
the terrorist act (Crenshaw 1995, 18; Smith 2004, 410).  In the Fall of 1999, 
Buford Furrow, a white supremacist, decided to attack Jews in a classic case of 
targeted violence as terrorism (Calhoun 2001, 68).  Furrow was deterred by the 
level of security at the first two sites he surveilled.  Fearing failure and personal 
danger in attacking a protected target, Furrow continued to search until he 
stumbled upon a Jewish community center that doubled as a day care center.  
Furrow did not care whom he shot - men, women or children - only that they 
happened to be present at the Jewish facility (Calhoun 2001, 59).  Jews, in 
whatever form, were targets symbolic of threats to Furrow’s white supremacist 
ideology.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The PTTV can be envisioned as a series of six steps leading to violence 
as shown in Figure One, below.  Without exception, none of the steps can be 
skipped and all must be taken before targeted violence can be accomplished 
 
4. Tradecraft consists of specialized skills that terrorist operatives use to evade detection by 
intelligence services and law enforcement, and includes how to hide out in cities using safe houses, contact 
other operatives, use encryption to protect e-mail addresses and phone numbers, construct improvised 
explosive devices, and other techniques necessary to evade detection, apprehension to conduct terrorist 
operations.  
(Calhoun 2001, 71).  The following examples, provided by Israel’s experience 
with suicide bombers, illustrate the PTTV process and why it is necessary to 
complete all steps before violence can occur.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Path to Terrorist Violence (adapted from Calhoun 2001, 71-90) 
 
Case One – Inability to Complete Path to Terrorist Violence - In June 
2005 Israeli troops arrested two Palestinians belonging to the militant Islamic 
Jihad in the West Bank on suspicion of planning suicide attacks against Israel 
(UPI 2005).  The militants were at Step Three, Research and Planning on the 
PTTV when arrested.  Step One, Grievance can be inferred by the long-standing 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict over occupied lands.  Step Two, Ideation also can be 
inferred by the militant’s progress on the PTTV because reaching the Research 
and Planning step implies that the militants have already accepted terrorist 
violence as a viable solution to existing grievances.  If the requisite Ideation had 
not already occurred, the militants would have no need to conduct Research and 
10 
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Planning in preparation for an attack.  By arresting the two while still in the 
Research and Planning stage, counter terrorism forces disrupted the plot 
essentially freezing the militant’s progress on the PTTV.  Arrest blocked their 
ability to take subsequent steps necessary to complete the PTTV by mounting an 
attack.   
Case Two – Inability to Complete Path to Terrorist Violence.  Israeli 
border police arrested Palestinian Wafa Ibrahim as she tried to pass through the 
security checkpoint at the Erez Terminal to the Gaza Strip while wearing 20 
pounds of explosives hidden in her underwear (Essing 2005).  She had a written 
doctor’s appointment and confessed that she was on her to way to blow herself 
up inside the hospital.  Ibrahim was stopped at the checkpoint before she could 
successfully complete Step Five – Breach (Essing 2005).  Due to her failure to 
breach her intended target, she was unable to complete the PTTV by reaching 
Step Six, Attack.   
Case Three – Completion of Path to Terrorist Violence.  Six people 
were killed and scores injured when Andaleeb Takataqah, a 20-year-old 
Palestinian seamstress, detonated the suicide vest she was wearing at a bus 
stop in Jerusalem (Haaretz 2005).  Witnesses reported that Takataqah 
apparently tried to enter the crowded open market area of Mahane Yehuda but 
was deterred by the large number of police and soldiers checking identity 
documents and parcels of people entering and leaving (Haaretz, 2005).  If 
Takataquah had decided against attacking that day in favor of choosing another, 
less well-defended target at a later date, she would have regressed back to 
Preparation on the PTTV while she waited for a second opportunity to attack.  
However, apparently Takataqah’s alternate target was a nearby bus stop.  While 
temporarily stalled at Step Five, Breach, Takataqah made a second attempt to 
attack and was able to bypass security at the bus stop to successfully achieve 
Step Five – Breach.  Once she breached security, she culminated her trip on the 
PTTV by detonating her explosives to reach Step Six – Attack.   
12 
As indicated in the cases above, group movement towards terrorist 
violence is not unidirectional or irresistible once it has begun.  The group can 
stop its progress for a variety of reasons, including the exodus of radical 
members pushing a violent agenda resulting in the loss of critical mass 
necessary to pursue violence, incapacitation by arrest of key members, or by 
pressure from law enforcement counter terrorism efforts that make it too risky to 
attempt an attack.  When interrupted from implementing an attack, as shown by 
the previous examples, groups may be frozen at a pre-attack step, or in other 
cases retreat along the path resulting in a lessened risk of violence and perhaps 
abandoning criminal acts altogether. In the months following the bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1991, anecdotal reports indicated 
that the level of carnage that resulted shocked some white supremacist groups 
that had been thinking about violence, or had reached the Research and 
Planning or Preparation stages for violent acts.  As a result, many abandoned, or 
at least temporarily retreated from their own plans for terrorist acts.   
The Secret Service ECSP found a number of attempted assassins who 
were not able to become actual assassins because they were prevented from 
completing the Path to Violence.  The appearance of effective, layered security 
that makes an attacker believe that an attack will fail can have a significant 
deterrent effect influencing an attacker to stop progress on the PTV.  Sometimes, 
an innocuous happenstance interferes with an attacker’s progress on the PTV.  A 
female attempted assassin at Step Five, Breach, on the PTV intended to shoot 
President George H. W. Bush as his motorcade drove past.  Just as the car 
came into view, a man standing next to her asked for the time.  As she dug in her 
pocket for her watch, Bush sped by (Calhoun 2001, 96).   
As these examples indicate, the nature of intended violence requires a 
group to complete each step on the Path to Terrorist Violence in sequence to 
reach Step Six – Attack.  Where counter terrorism efforts were effective in stalling 
movement on the PTTV, violence did not occur.  By contrast, where an attacker 
was able to complete the PTTV, intended violence culminated in a sucessful 
attack.   
13 
1. The Path to Terrorist Violence Construct 
The PTTV is predicated on the six steps of the Path to Violence.  For the 
purposes of counter terrorism efforts, Step One - Grievance, Step Two - Ideation 
and Step Three - Research and Planning may be the most fruitful for identifying 
terrorist violence potential while still in the inchoate stage of development before 
violence occurs.   
Step One: Grievance – The existence of grievances is considered by 
Crenshaw to be the first condition necessary for terrorism (1972, 383). In the 
context of radical groups, grievances stem from frustration with progress by less 
radical means usually pertaining to a chronic or intractable problem that affects 
the attainment of its objectives.   
The concept of grievance must be interpreted in its broadest meaning to 
comprehend the influence it has on motivating a group to engage in terrorist acts.  
Grievance is commonly defined as a complaint regarding the status quo made 
against those in authority (Wikipedia 2005a).  A prominent example is the 
Declaration of Independence that contained a list of colonists’ grievances against 
the King of England.  Grievances over what may appear to some as trivial 
concerns can be a significant source of frustration and deep emotion to others.  
The frustration and anger associated with grievances, sometimes historical and 
multi-generational, can become part of the social fabric and collective identity of 
the aggreieved.  Groups formed from communities with long-standing, shared 
grievances may have no firsthand experience with the policies or actions that led 
to the grievances affecting previous generations, but through encultration, 
socialization and custom feel the same frustration and anger.  Knowing the 
precise nature of a group’s grievance can provide tremendous insight into how 
strongly they may feel compelled to act out violently (Calhoun 2001, 75).  
Grievances often are discernable via communiqués, Internet postings, 
manifestos, ultimatums or treatises.   
The existence of grievances implies frustration with the attainment of 
group goals.  The frustration variable may be a significant indicator of terrorist 
14 
violence potential.  For example, frustration within mainstream social movements 
with the pace of change through conventional tactics, such as public education, 
protest and civil disobedience, appears to act as a common catalyst to 
organizational splintering.  Impatience with goal attainment provides a significant 
rationale in the decision to adopt terrorist violence.  Action, including violence, 
becomes imperative because the group feels the challenge of change cannot be 
left to the future and, hindered by limited means, the group sees the choice as 
between action as survival and inaction as the death of the movement 
(Crenshaw 1972, 388).  In essence, decaying mainstream protest movements 
often are important to the formation of terrorist groups because they spawn 
splintering and increased radicalization that can lead to terrorist violence 
(Weinberg and Eubank 1990, 140). 
The view that political violence, including terrorist violence, is a potential 
consequence of a faltering social movement holds that the development of a 
revolutionary dimension and increased risk of violence occurs when various 
factions begin to fragment along ideological lines over disagreements about what 
methods to employ to achieve group goals (Gentry 2004, 275).  As Laqueur 
(1997, 47) states, “It is difficult to think of any terrorist group which did not split at 
one time or another…. the result of a confrontation between hardliners and 
relative moderates.”  This effect can be seen in contemporary movements 
involved in extremist environmental causes.  For example, public statements by 
spokespersons for the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) cite a growing demand by 
disenchanted members for the escalation of violence to include targeted violence 
against individuals associated with corporations, government agencies and other 
entities viewed as contributing to environmental abuse (Bosworth 2002). 
The frustration-splintering phenomena often results in increased 
radicalization as more extreme members coalesce into a distinct subgroup willing 
to resort to increased violence to attain group objectives (Gurr 1998, 87).  This 
phenomenon was evident in the 1960’s radical anti-Vietnam War group Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS) that splintered to yield the terrorist group 
Weather Underground Organization (WUO) (Jacobs 1997, 8-22). The WUO was 
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a self-described revolutionary organization of leftist women and men formed by 
splintered-off members of the SDS.  Weathermen advocated the overthrow of the 
government and capitalism.  Toward that end they carried out a campaign of 
bombings, jailbreaks, and riots.  The Weathermen were active from 1969 to 
1976.  In 1970, the group issued a “Declaration of War” against the United States 
government and began a series of bombings including preparations for a 
bombing of a US military noncommissioned officers' dance at Fort Dix, NJ in 
what WUO member Mark Rudd said was going to be "the most horrific hit that 
the United States government had ever suffered on its territory.”  When three 
WUO members died in an accidental explosion while preparing the Ft. Dix bomb, 
other cells re-evaluated their plans and decided to pursue only non-lethal terrorist 
violence. The group released a number of manifestos and declarations while 
conducting a series of bombings including the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, police 
stations and prison buildings, among other targets (Jacobs 1997, 12-40). 
Step 2: Ideation.  In the context of judicial threateners, ideation often is 
evident following delivery of an Inappropriate Communication and Contact 
(IC&C) (DCSO, 2001).  IC&Cs include communications or threats received in 
writing, in person, by telephone, fax, email, by informant or third party, or via 
suspicious activity directed at the judiciary or elected officials.  IC&Cs contain 
inappropriate references such as threats, direct or specific, veiled (“You’ll get 
yours”), or conditional (“you’d better do… or I will”), pseudo-legal court filings 
from quasi-courts other than duly constituted federal, state or local governments, 
evidence of suspicious behavior, stalking behavior, or research on the personal 
affairs of the judicial or elected official, references to bodyguards, security, 
safety, danger, etc. or anything that is disjointed in content, sinister, or otherwise 
questionable (DCSO, 2001). 
In the context of radical groups, ideation may be evident in the delivery of 
a manifesto, ultimatum, treatise or communiqué containing veiled or overt threats 
along the same parameters of an IC&C.   Examples include the Weather 
Underground Organization’s Declaration of War delivered by Bernardine Dohrn 
as Weather Underground Communiqué #1, May 21 1970.  It read:  
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I’m going to read a declaration of a state of war.  This is the first 
communication from the Weatherman Underground.  All over the 
world, people fighting Amerikan (sic) imperialism look to Amerika’s 
(sic) youth to use our strategic position behind enemy lines to join 
forces in the destruction of the empire…Within the next fourteen 
days we will attack a symbol or institution of Amerikan (sic) 
injustice. (Jacobs 1997, 56) 
On June 9, an anonymous call warned that a bomb had been planted and 
that evacuation was necessary.  Shortly thereafter, explosions damaged the 
headquarters of the New York City Police Department (Jacobs 1997, 67).  
Similarly, anti-abortion websites that post the names of abortion doctors 
accompanied by treatises legitimizing the assassination of abortion providers as 
“justifiable homicide” reveal ideation advocating terrorist violence. 
A group’s increasing radicalization oftentimes is reflected in the tone and 
content of its open source communications.  The importance of ideation and 
rhetoric is highlighted by Crenshaw: 
…attention should be paid to the words that terrorists issue - 
memoirs, pronouncements, rationales.  Although these words may 
be self-serving, that does not mean that they are not also, in some 
significant way, revealing. (1995, 277) 
Sprinzak’s Crisis of Legitimacy theory clarifies the importance of ideation 
in progress towards acts of terrorism (1991, 50).  This process – a psycho-
political crisis of legitimacy – is marked by a syndrome consisting of four 
components: (1) a political language of delegitimization of the regime; (2) rhetoric 
and symbols of depersonalization and dehumanization of individuals belonging to 
the system; (3) intended and planned violence, and (4) terrorism.  Terrorism 
implies a crisis of legitimacy that influences a radical, pre-terrorist group to reject 
the government’s legitimacy to the point of challenging it with unconventional 
violence (Sprinzak 1991, 50).  Crisis of legitimacy matures through a lengthy 
process of delegitimization of the established society and government.  Like 
other explanations of the radicalization of social movements, delegitimization 
usually begins in radical groups at risk of escalation, referred to by Sprinzak as 
pre-terrorist groups (1991, 52).  An extreme form of this radicalization - 
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transformational delegitimization - usually takes place in democracies and can 
invert all of the political, cultural and moral codes of the individuals involved 
leading to extremes in violence (Sprinzak 1991, 58).   
The delegitimization process involves three distinct evolutionary stages: 
crisis of confidence; conflict of legitimacy; and crisis of legitimacy (Sprinzak 1991, 
55).  The process begins with crisis of confidence that implies a conflict with 
specific rulers or policies.  This stage is characterized by a profound 
disenchantment with what is usually thought of as “the establishment.”  While not 
illegal at this point, the group’s mentality, language and behavior are likely to be 
countercultural, like that seen in new left groups of the 1960’s, including the 
WUO: 
Perhaps the most bizarre…act of the Weathermen was the 
applause they gave to the murder of movie actress Sharon Tate 
and her friends by Charles Manson and his “family”…the 
Weathermen celebrated the event as an act of liberation of utmost 
significance. Bernardine Dohrn was quoted as saying “Dig it, first 
they killed those pigs then they ate dinner in the same room with 
them, then they even shoved a fork in the victim’s stomach!  Wild!” 
(Sprinzak 1995, 79; quotations in original) 
The intermediate stage is the conflict of legitimacy behavioral stage that 
evolves when a radical group, previously engaged in anti-government criticism, is 
ready to question the legitimacy of the entire system of governance.  Members 
view the system as manipulative and repressive as they embrace an alternative 
ideological and cultural system (Sprinzak 1991, 54).  This stage commonly 
follows on the heels of a profound disappointment with the effectiveness of the 
group’s previous tactics.  Moderates may become enraged and frustrated either 
by the government’s hostile response to their criticisms, or by their own failure to 
achieve significant progress in achieving group goals.  This stage of 
delegitimization is evidenced by active political action ranging from 
demonstrations, confrontations and petty vandalism, to relatively uncoordinated 
and small-scale intentional violence against symbols of the system (Sprinzak 
1991, 56). 
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The culmination of this process is a crisis of legitimacy.  This stage is 
essentially an expansion of the previous delegitimization of the system to every 
person and entity associated with it characterized by depersonalization and 
dehumanization that makes it possible for group members to distance 
themselves morally and to commit atrocities (Sprinzak 1991, 57; della Porta 
1995, 49).  This stage is usually reached in second or later generations of radical 
group members. 
The importance of Sprinzak’s model in understanding the context of 
radical group ideation is that the first external indication of group evolution is 
often linguistic and symbolic (1991, 57).  The government and its supporters are 
portrayed as “things”, “dogs”, “pigs”, “Nazis” or “terrorists”.  Each individual who 
is a member of the government, or is associated with it in the eyes of the group, 
is a potential target for violence (Sprinzak 1991, 57).  The operational methods 
include systematic terrorism and the formation of small, covert terror cells 
engaged in unconventional attacks on the system.  Totally isolated from the 
outside world, the group constructs its own reality and accompanying behavioral 
and moral standards that are enforced with an iron hand: 
Young couples living in “weather collectives” were required to 
“smash monogamy” and to reject natural parenthood.  The 
“Weather Bureau” ordered that all female revolutionaries sleep with 
all male revolutionaries, and vice versa.  Women were also to make 
love to each other.  Private relations of love and affection were 
declared counterrevolutionary, because they represented bourgeois 
habits.  “Weather” mothers who were suspected of devoting too 
much time to their babies (born in the course of the “revolution”) 
were told to give the revolution first priority.  There were cases in 
which they were even ordered to give their babies to other, less 
committed, members of the organization, so that they could devote 
all of their energies to the cause. (Sprinzak 1991, 58; quotations in 
original) 
According to threat assessment researchers, those who think about 
committing a violent act often have trouble keeping those thoughts to themselves 
(Calhoun 2001, 80).  Indicators of ideation are obtainable from group 
communiqués, Internet postings, propaganda, interviews with group leaders and 
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news releases, mergers or alliances with groups with a history of violence and 
evidence suggesting that a group has begun to think of violence as a viable 
course of action including threats, references to approaches or stalking and 
surveillance of individuals, security measures, and similar behavior.  These signs 
are merely indicators and although ideation is an essential step on the Path to 
Terrorist Violence, signs of ideation may not appear in each case.  When signs of 
ideation are apparent, they should be treated as potential clues, not as 
categorical evidence of intent or exclusive of other indicators and signs (Calhoun, 
2001, 109). 
Research linking terrorist violence potential to value references contained 
in terrorist documents examined whether the psychological characteristics of a 
group’s rhetoric might identify violent tendencies.  Using content analysis of the 
values in key group documents, researchers attempted to determine if value 
references are indicative of violent tendencies (Smith 2004, 411).  The 
documents examined included 166 items found through open sources including 
university library collections, newspapers, Internet sites set up by the group, 
letters, pamphlets and interviews.  Values, like those described below, attributed 
to opponents and to the group itself, play important roles in the rhetoric of groups 
engaging in acts of terrorism: 
Dominance - combat or physical aggression, valuing fighting, 
struggle; punishing, retaliating; victory in war, typified by statements 
such as “We will not stop fighting until there’s no one left to fight.”   
Also valuing power over people, authority, leadership, influence 
indicated by statements such as “We need to lead our people into 
the new millennium.”   
Morality - morality, goodness, distinguishing right from wrong or 
honesty and keeping promises. Valuing being good in a moral 
sense; conscience, right vs. wrong. Typical statements include “We 
must always be on the side of good and fight evil.” Truthfulness, 
truth-speaking and truth-acting; not lying; not concealing the truth; 
keeping promises, highlighted by statements such as “Honesty is 
always the best policy.” 
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Justice – justice and tolerance values such as fairness toward all 
or valuing humanity and the absence of cruelty. Justice values 
included justice, valuing equality, fairness or equal opportunity; fair-
mindedness, or open-mindedness towards everyone. Justice 
values were typified by statements such as “We must respect the 
rights of all human beings” while tolerance included valuing 
diversity, non-prejudice, the absence of ill will, suspicion or hostility, 
indicated by statements such as “We must respect people from 
different backgrounds.” 
Culture - culture and religion such as valuing the history and 
traditions of its own group or valuing God and religious practices.  
Culture values Culture: Valuing the art, history, or traditions of one’s 
own group. “We should never forget our heritage.” Religion: Valuing 
God or religious texts and practices. “God must inspire all of our 
actions.” (Smith 2004, 416 – 421; quotations in original) 
 
Researchers found that the morality value was a significant indicator of 
terrorist violence potential.  Groups that view themselves as morally superior to 
others are more likely to engage in violence (Smith 2004, 418).  Groups that see 
themselves as a morally superior elite regard conventional standards of behavior 
as irrelevant.  They view themselves as acting in order to preserve a sense of 
moral superiority or righteousness that facilitates evolution to violence including 
justifying terrorist attacks by creating an “evil enemy” image of opponents.  
Ominously, groups that had an elevated sense moral superiority were deemed 
more likely to justify using civilians as pawns in the struggle against their 
enemies (Smith 2004, 414).   
Sometimes ideation appears as a preoccupation with another incident of 
violence that inspires an act of revenge.  Oklahoma City bomber Timothy 
McVeigh blew up the Murrah Federal Building on the anniversary of the day that 
the Branch Davidian compound burned in Waco, TX following a lengthy standoff 
with federal law enforcement agents.  Ideation also is manifested in fascination 
with another assassin or terror group.  The killing of abortion doctors by 
adherents of the Army of God (AOG) and its “justifiable homicide” doctrine 
illustrates this effect.  In March 1992, AOG follower Michael Griffen assassinated 
abortion provider Dr. David Gunn.  For the next year and a half, Paul Hill 
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championed Griffen's action under the justifiable homicide doctrine (MIPT 2005).   
He circulated petitions, appeared on talk shows, and began focusing on Dr. 
Gunn's replacement.  In August 1993, Hill completed his trip on the Path to 
Terrorist Violence by shooting Dr. John Britton and escort David Barrett outside a 
Pensacola, FL abortion clinic.  Explaining his rationale, Hill stated "Michael 
Griffen had been dismissed as being mentally unbalanced, but I was a former 
Presbyterian minister."  He reasoned that because he had better credentials, his 
act of violence would have more credibility than Griffen's (Calhoun 2001, 81). 
Step 3: Research and Planning.  Once a group has embraced the idea 
that violence is a viable solution the next step along the path is to plan the attack.  
Planning requires some degree of research, if only to determine where the target 
will be on the day of the attack and the best way to make the assault.  Of all the 
steps on the PTTV, these behaviors are the most noticeable because they force 
group members into the open to collect the required information to mount a 
successful attack.  In order to research the target the attacker has to ask 
questions and has to engage in behaviors associated with collecting information.  
The information itself may require direct observation, querying associates of the 
target, or searching public records stored by public custodians (Calhoun and 
Weston 2003, 74).  In addition, the target may notice being followed, neighbors 
may report strangers asking questions and co-workers may notice a suspicious 
car parked nearby.   
Evidence of research and planning also can come from the content of 
Internet website postings, group propaganda, communiqués and other open 
source information provided by the group itself.  Animal Liberation Front website 
posts document an ominous escalation in tactics: 
You can install all of the motion sensor lights in the world and it 
won't make a difference. You've been marked. …We've been in 
your house while in San Francisco. We've 'bumped' into you at 
Costco. You've given us the time while in line at Bank of America. 




Other evidence may be provided by the targets themselves, such as 
reports of suspicious cars in the neighborhood or unusual inquiries such as 
references to personal information about the target such as size of family, type of 
car driven, personal habits, spouse's place of employment, or favorite 
restaurants.  All of these indicate some degree of target research (Calhoun 2001, 
135). 
Not every case involves extensive planning; AOG follower Michael Griffen 
killed Dr. Gunn simply by researching the kind of car Gunn drove, the routes he 
took to and from work, and where he parked at the reproductive health care 
clinic.  When he saw Gunn's car enter the parking lot, Griffen knew the doctor 
would pull into the alley behind the clinic and park near the back door.  Griffen 
walked down the alley and shot the doctor as he got out of his car.  Clearly, little 
sophisticated planning was involved in Gunn’s murder (Calhoun 2001, 85). 
This step demarcates an important evolution on the Path to Terrorist 
Violence: crossing the threshold of dangerousness and observability and the 
onset of criminal conduct.  Crossing the threshold of observability exposes the 
group to detection because research, such as making inquiries, forces the group 
into the open where such actions are theoretically observable.  Similarly, the 
threshold of criminal conduct is determined by the transition from contemplating 
violence – ideation or thinking about violence is not illegal - to taking active 
precursor steps in preparation for violence that constitute inchoate criminal 
activity under conspiracy laws.  As a criminal act, this step heightens the group’s 
dangerousness as they engage in the requisite preparatory steps for violence.   
From a counterterrorism perspective, illegal conduct by a radical group is 
significant in two ways.  First, restrictions on intrusive criminal intelligence 
methods, such as physical surveillance, electronic monitoring, including wiretaps 
and audio and data intercepts of voice, fax, cell phone and computer 
communications, are loosened once the threshold of criminal conduct has been 
crossed.  Since all terrorist violence - including conspiratorial activity in 
preparation for violence - is illegal, many constitutional restrictions on intelligence 
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targeting of non-criminal activities, or pre-criminal groups, do not apply.  Using 
intrusive intelligence methods enhances police ability to more effectively detect 
terrorist plots.  Second, the ability to arrest, convict and imprison group members 
for their crimes disrupts plots and incapacitates by incarceration those arrested, 
as well as deterring, at least theoretically, others from doing the same thing.   
Step 4: Preparation.  This step on the path includes activities such as 
acquiring a weapon, ammunition or explosives, assembling equipment, and 
arranging transportation.  It also includes activities such as timing preparations 
so that the attack occurs on a significant date.  An obvious example is the timing 
of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on the 
anniversary of the FBI assault on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX.  
Preparations include conducting final act behaviors and costuming.  These types 
of preparation are usually restricted to suicidal individuals who put their affairs in 
order so that loose ends are not left after their deaths.  Before Jack Gary 
McKnight assaulted the Federal Courthouse in Jefferson County, KS, he 
engaged in obvious final act behaviors.  He made several homemade bombs, 
killed his dog, burned his second car, dressed in his best suit - a form of 
costuming - and made a videotape explaining why he attacked the courthouse 
and expected to die in the attack (Calhoun 2001, 5).  McKnight was to be 
sentenced to prison on charges of possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute and using a firearm while committing a drug offense. He was indicted 
on those charges along with his wife, Cynthia, who pleaded guilty and was to be 
sentenced later in the week.  Subtle and seemingly irrational acts, like costuming 
and final act behaviors, can reveal intentions if those responsible for threat 
assessment are aware of their significance.   
Like Research and Planning, Preparation involves activities that are 
potentially noticeable (Calhoun 2001, 91).  Preparations often extend beyond 
obtaining a weapon or assembling the deadly or destructive equipment.  Groups 
also have to raise the resources necessary to pay for the attack.  Preparations 
often require interactions with others such as gathering materials from a variety 
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of sources and the assembly of that material.  There is no standard rule for what 
the preparations may be, except that the group has to prepare for the attack.   
The simultaneous existence of Grievances and the concomitant Ideation 
that considers violence as an acceptable redress, while reprehensible, is not 
against the law.  As a group continues its trek on the Path to Terrorist Violence 
engaging in subsequent acts - such as Research and Planning - it crosses the 
threshold of criminal conduct.  Reaching the Preparation step moves the group 
deeper into crime and further along the path towards terrorist violence.   
Step 5: Breach.  The final step before the actual attack is to breach 
security to approach the target with a weapon.  The attackers have to position 
themselves in proximity to the target.  Getting close is a noticeable and 
potentially preventable logistical exercise, especially if rehearsals and dry runs 
are involved (Calhoun 2001, 85).  
Step 6: Attack.  The ultimate step on the path is to assault the target with 
a weapon or destructive device (Calhoun 2001, 95).  When Buford Farrow was 
prevented from attacking his first two targets because of security, his progress on 
the PTTV was blocked, at least temporarily.  Seeking less well-secured targets, 
Furrow was able to complete the PTTV by shooting up a daycare at a Jewish 
Community Center. 
B. SUMMARY 
The PTTV is supported by a solid theoretical foundation that supports the 
idea that the existence of grievances, group splintering and the process of 
increased radicalization, followed by discernable ideation supporting terrorism 
are valid and accurate indicators of terrorist violence potential.  Beginning with 
the validity of the underlying Path to Violence concept, and expanding it to 
include the characteristics of radical groups at risk of escalation to terrorist 
violence, the PTTV becomes a proactive assessment tool to identify precursor 
activities indicative of terrorist violence.   
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The PTTV construct, envisioned as a path consisting of six steps leading 
to violence, is conceptually clean and intuitively easy to grasp.  By focusing on 
actions rather than ambiguous and largely invalid race, ethnicity or trait-based 
assumptions of individuals or groups at risk, the PTTV can be used to assess 
terrorist violence potential for a wide variety of domestic radical groups.  
Assessing groups at risk for grievance and ideation indicative of terrorist 
violence, and supporting those assessments by identifying the elements of 
premeditation and planning inherent in intended violence, counter terrorism 
forces are armed with a useful threat assessment tool that enables them to 
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III. TESTING THE FIT: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THREE 
GROUPS 
To test the efficacy of the Path to Terrorist Violence the histories of three 
groups are examined, chosen from across the spectrum of domestic radical 
groups.  An overview of each group is provided as background followed by an 
analysis of each group’s grievances, ideation and subsequent progress towards 
violence on the PTTV.  Although the PTTV model includes Breach and Attack as 
distinct steps, in reality Breach occurs nearly simultaneously with Attack in many 
acts of terrorist violence.  When ALF members were angered by an unflattering 
portrayal of them as terrorists, they attacked a British documentary film producer 
outside his residence, kidnapping and branding him with the letters “ALF” (ALF 
2005c).  The Breach and the Attack steps occurred in such quick succession that 
they could be viewed essentially as simultaneous acts.  For the purposes of 
brevity and clarity, unless there are significant deviations from this pattern in the 
case studies examined, Breach and Attack are described together.  Variations in 
method of breach and form of attack are provided and often are determined by 
the nature of the target, the environment of the attack and the idiosyncrasies of 
the group. 
The efficacy of the PTTV model is predicated on the ability to spot terrorist 
violence potential before an attack occurs.  Detecting group intentions at Step 
Four, Preparation, or later on the PTTV, increases the likelihood that law 
enforcement will be unable to stop an attack.  Late stage detection of terrorist 
plots increases the risk that more extreme members of the group, or a competing 
group, will attempt to upstage the plot by attacking early or separately choosing 
different targets.  Identifying violence potential from a group’s reaction to 
grievance or ideation is the ultimate goal because it enables counter terrorism 
interventions while plans for violence are still in the planning or preparatory 
stages.  It is difficult to accurately identify terrorist grievance and ideation without 
an assessment tool because they lie below the criminal and observability 
thresholds.  In addition, although not studied in this research, there appears to be 
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a form of PTTV inertia stemming from group movement towards violence.  If 
PTTV inertia is a common phenomenon, counter terrorism effectiveness is 
improved by earlier interventions that prevent its onset.   
Open source analysis of a group’s communications can provide key 
indicators of terrorist violence potential in the Grievance and Ideation steps.  As 
described previously, research has demonstrated that key value references in 
radical group communiqués, press releases, manifestos, Internet postings, group 
propaganda, and statements by leaders and spokespersons can be used to 
assess the risk of violence (Smith 2004, 412). 
A. GROUP ONE: HISTORIC LEFTIST RADICAL GROUP 
1. Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 
The Symbionese Liberation Army was a domestic terrorist group following 
a radical leftist ideology that considered itself a revolutionary vanguard army. 
Members of the group were accused of committing murders, bank robberies, and 
other acts of violence between 1973 and 1975.  Never numbering more than 13 
members, its motto was "Death to the fascist insect that preys upon the life of the 
people” (Stone 2004). 
The SLA formed as a result of a prison visitation program affiliated with 
the Venceremos Movement (VM) (Stone 2004).  Venceremos, Spanish for “we 
will conquer”, was a radical political group formed in 1971 by Stanford University 
Professor H. Bruce Franklin and various other members of the San Francisco 
Bay Area chapter of the Maoist Revolutionary Union.  The VM took its name from 
the battle cry of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a revolutionary communist leader from 
Argentina and a high ranking member of Fidel Castro's communist government in 
Cuba (Bryan 1975, 102).  Venceremos advocated armed self-defense of the 
citizenry, community control of the police, and prison reform.  Group members 
worked to educate prisoners and defend Vietnam war protesters (Bryan 1975, 
105).  Many SLA members were former VM members who believed that 
America's prisons were concentration camps designed to repress African 
Americans.  Willie Wolfe, an anthropology student active in VM, developed this 
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ideology into a plan for action linking student ideologists with prisoner militants. 
(Stone 2004.)  One of these militants was inmate Donald DeFreeze, imprisoned 
for a series of crimes ranging from petty theft to violent armed robbery (Payne et 
al. 1976, 19). 
DeFreeze was instrumental in forming the SLA after his escape from 
Soledad prison in March 1973.  Following escape, he sought refuge among his 
contacts with VM members and associates in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
eventually sharing living quarters with future SLA members Wolfe, Russ Little, 
and Patricia Soltysik, also known by her SLA nom de’guerre "Mizmoon."  
DeFreeze and Soltysik drafted the outline for the "Symbionese Nation” that 
centered on the concept of "Symbionese" derived from symbiosis, a biology term 
used to denote mutually beneficial interaction between different species (Payne 
et al. 1976, 51).  The founders of the SLA had different human races in mind 
when coining the term.  It is ironic that although members of the SLA considered 
themselves leaders of a Black revolution, DeFreeze was the only Afircan 
American member.  The infusion of DeFreeze’s criminal expertise led the 
predominantly white, middle class SLA core from revolutionary rhetoric to 
terrorist action (Bryan 1975, 142).  DeFreeze adopted the nom de’guerre “Field 
Marshal Cinque” taking his name from the leader of a slave rebellion that took 
over the Spanish slave ship Amistad in 1839 (Bryan 1975, 81).   
During this formative period the group’s primary activity was acquiring and 
training with firearms (Bryan 1975, 5).  The SLA’s first terrorist operation 
occurred in November 1973 when they murdered Oakland, California 
superintendent of schools Dr. Marcus Foster with their trademark cyanide-tipped 
bullets (Stone 2004).  In a 2004 interview, Little stated that Foster, who was 
black, was assassinated because De Freeze believed that he was the front man 
for a wide-ranging police conspiracy to further subjugate blacks and minorities 
beginning with the mandatory issuance of student identification cards in Oakland 
schools (Stone 2004).   
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The SLA’s second major action was the  kidnapping of publishing heiress 
Patricia Hearst in February 1974 from her Berkeley area apartment.  Hearst was 
kidnapped to trade for SLA members Wolfe and Little who had been captured 
following a shootout with police.  When the swap failed, the SLA issued 
alternative ransom demands that included massive deliveries of free food to poor 
people in the San Francisco Bay area (Stone 2004).   While under SLA control, 
Hearst was radicalized and assumed the nom de’guerre “Tania.”  She was 
indoctrinated in SLA ideology and later made tape recordings for the group to 
announce demands and conditions.  After release, she claimed that she had 
been brainwashed by her captors or was suffering the symptoms of “Stockholm 
syndrome” in which captives come to identify with their captors (Stone 2004).   
The SLA’s next action was the robbery of the Hibernia Bank; violence that 
included the shooting of two innocent bystanders.  Hearst participated in the 
robbery and was videotaped by security cameras holding a rifle and issuing 
orders to customers.  She later was tried and convicted for her involvement and 
served time in prision.  As a result of the Hibernia robbery and heightened police 
efforts to find the group, the SLA moved operations to the Los Angeles area 
(Payne et al. 1976, 262). 
The violent demise of the group began on May 16, 1974 when William and 
Emily Harris and Patty Hearst were involved in a shooting following a failed 
shoplifting attempt at a sporting goods store in Inglewood, California.  In the 
chaos following the violence they abandoned their van leaving police to find the 
address of their safehouse from a parking ticket in the glove box.  The rest of the 
SLA fled the safehouse when they saw the events on the TV news (Payne et al. 
1976, 271).   
Seeking new shelter, SLA members took over a house in a black 
neighborhood.  The next day an anonymous caller notified the Los Angeles 
Police that a group of heavily armed people had commandeered a family 
member’s home.  Police sealed off the neighborhood and surrounded the house 
and following demands to surrender, Special Weapons and Tactics Team 
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members fired tear gas into the house.  SLA members inside responded with 
heavy bursts of automatic gunfire.  The house ultimately caught fire from the tear 
gas projectiles and when two women charged from the burning building still firing 
at police, they were shot and killed.  The rest died from the fire (Payne et al. 
1976, 290).  The bodies of Nancy Ling Perry ("Fahiza"), Angela Atwood 
("General Gelina"), Willie Wolfe (“Cujo”) who was reputedly Patricia Hearst's 
lover, Donald DeFreeze ("Fieldmarshall Cinque"), Patricia Soltysik ("Mizmoon", 
"Zoya"), and Camilla Hall ("Gabi") were found (McLellan and Avery 1977, 362).  
As a result of the seige, the remaining SLA members returned to the relative 
safety of the Bay Area and the anonynimty provided by hiding among the large 
conclave of student radicals in the area.   
Surviving SLA members, Bill and Emily Harris and Pattty Hearst, were 
joined by new members Wendy Yoshimura, Kathleen and Steve Soliah, James 
Kilgore and Michael Bortin. The reconstituted SLA began a relatively minor 
bombing campaign in the Bay Area and in April 1975, robbed the Crocker 
National Bank in Carmichael, California, killing bank customer Myrna Opsahl in 
the process (McLellan and Avery 1977, 444).  Patty Hearst was ultimately 
captured with Wendy Yoshimura later that year.   
The last action by the SLA was the unsuccesful attempt by Kathleen 
Soliah to kill LAPD officers in August 1975.  Several improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) she placed under a police car failed to detonate. Soliah and other 
SLA members remained fugitives until 1999.  In January 2002 first-degree 
murder charges for the killing of Myrna Opsahl were filed against SLA members 
Soliah, the Harrises, Bortin, and Kilgore.  Emily Harris, now known as Emily 
Montague, admitted to being the one holding the murder weapon, but said that 
the shotgun went off accidentally.  According to a public statement by Hearst, 
Montague had dismissed the murder at the time saying, "She was a bourgeois 
pig anyway. Her husband is a doctor" (McLellan and Avery 1977, 447).  
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2. The SLA Path to Terrorist Violence 
Grievance – As a New Left organization, the SLA followed an ideology 
that differed from earlier leftist movements that had been oriented towards labor 
activism.  The New Left strain was intellectually driven and adopted a broader 
definition of political activism, commonly called social activism, exemplified in the 
SLA’s roots in extremist prison reform and Black Nationalism sentiments. The 
many grievances stemming from this ideology shaped the revolutionary nature of 
the group and resulted in dehumanization of its opponents by referring to them 
as insects consistent with value references indicative of terrorism (Smith 2004, 
411).  Typical of group grievances and the belief in armed struggle and revolution 
was the SLA Declaration of War: 
The …Symbionese Liberation Army is made up of the aged, youth, 
and women and men of all races and people.  The name 
Symbionese is taken from the word symbiosis and we define its 
meaning as a body of dissimilar bodies and organisms living in 
deep and loving harmony and partnership and the best interest of 
all within that body…We of the Symbionese Federation and the 
S.L.A. are the children of all oppressed people , who have decided 
to redefine ourselves as a Symbionese Race and People …to die a 
race, and be born a nation, is to become free…(Bryan 1975, 169) 
References to “oppression” and “death before freedom” suggest deep-
seated grievances that the group expressed via communiqués recorded on 
audiotape and delivered to radio stations. That method of delivery, and the 
militant rhetoric of the SLA, made an impression on the American public and law 
enforcement which viewed the group as a significant threat (Nason 2004). 
Ideation – There is also abundant evidence of SLA ideation indicating 
movement towards terrorist violence contained in various communiques and 
literature recovered by poilice from safehouses and following the arrests of group 
members (McLellan and Avery 1977, 170).  Notable among them for the 
purposes of this research were plans to overthrow the existing capitalist system 
including overt threats like that in the group’s slogan, “Death to the Facist Insect 
that Preys Upon the Life of the Citizens” (Stone 2004). 
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Research and Planning – The SLA conducted surveillance of potential 
targets and fairly sophisticated research and planning like that involved in the 
kidnapping of Patricia Hearst and the assassination of Marcus Foster (McLellan 
& Avery 1977, 169-171).  During a search of a hastily abandoned safe house, 
police found a detailed sketch of the Foster ambush scene and another detailing 
the site of an armed robbery in Berkely.  Also included were schedules of 
surveillance duty and maps and detailed plans for robberies and ambushes. 
Preparations – SLA members were fairly sophisticated in terrorist trade-
craft.  The infusion of criminal expertise with DeFreeze’s membership 
undoubtedly increased the group’s potentcy.  They were sucessful in obtaining 
weapons, ammunition, and constructing and using IEDs, found and  used safe-
houses, and understood and manipulated the ‘terrorism as theater concept” by 
manipulating the news media via release of communique’s, using kidnap victim 
Patty Hearst to record group demands, and by using cyanide-tipped bullets in the 
Marcus Foster assasination (McLellan and Avery 1977, 131).  Brian Jenkins 
summed up what terrorism is when he said “Terrorism is aimed at the people 
watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism is theater” (Jenkins B. quoted in 
Nacos 1994). 
Breach & Attack – Breach is self-evident in their success in kidnapping, 
assassination, bombing, and bank robbery.  Group success in perpetrating 
violence by attack is self-evident in varied succesful attacks such as assaults on 
police, bank robbery, kidnapping, bombings and assasination. 
3. Analysis  
The PTTV analysis of the SLA proves to be a valid threat assessment 
model clearly indicating the potential for violence evident in the grievance and 
ideation stages.  However, history has shown that public (and police) awareness 
of the group occurred simultaneously with its first act of violence precluding the 
possiblity of proactively identifying terrorist violence potential prior to the group’s 
first attack.  It is purely speculation, but if intelligence entities had PTTV 
assessment capability during the radical milieu of the Berkely and Bay Area 
34 
during this period, they could have identified terrorist violence potential in 
statements and activities of VM members, prison radicals and their associates.  
Many were well known radicals who lived, or were associated, with groups and 
individuals that espoused views indicative of terrorist violence potential in 
expressed greivance and ideation advocating the violent overthrow of the 
government.  Ideation that advocates violence would have established the 
requisite criminal predicate required to initiate criminal intelligence investigations 
that could, theoretically, have spotted terrorist violence potential or conspiratorial 
activities before violence occurred.   
B. GROUP TWO: CONTEMPORARY SINGLE ISSUE GROUP 
1. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is an extremist animal rights group 
classifed as a terrorist organization by the FBI.  Its organization is decentralized, 
an example of leaderless resistance, with no formal membership or hierarchy 
that serves to cloak members in anonynimity and shield them from arrest and 
prosecution.  A cell can consist of a single person.  There are active ALF cells in 
most European countries, Russia, Australia and the United States and Canada 
(Jarboe 2002).  ALF members embrace an ideology that rails against speciesism; 
the exploitation of one species by another, commonly the exploitation of animals 
by humans (Monaghan 1997, 109).   
ALF began as a small group of fox hunt saboteurs in England in the 
1960s. The Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA) laid false scents and blew hunting 
horns to send the hounds in the wrong direction.  In 1972 they set up the more 
militant Band of Mercy that attacked hunters' vehicles by slashing tires and 
breaking windows (ALF 2005c). The group progressed to attacking 
pharmaceutical laboratories and seal-hunting boats.  The Animal Liberation Front 
splintered from the HSA and formed a more radical organization after two Band 
of Mercy members were jailed in 1975 (Jarboe 2002).  The FBI claims that the
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American branch of the ALF began its operations in the late 1970s, but the group 
became more high profile in 1982 and made the FBI's domestic terrorism list in 
1987 with a multi-million dollar arson at a veterinary lab in California (Jarboe 
2002). 
Similar to ALF activities in the United Kingdom and Canada, the American 
ALF has attacked varied targets from medical and scientific research laboratories 
to butcher shops and retail furriers. The organization has claimed credit for 
stealing research animals, destroying research equipment and records, and acts 
of vandalism and arson. In August of 2003, ALF activists claimed responsibility 
for the release of 10,000 mink from a mink farm in Washington State (ALF 
2005c).  According to their website ALF's stated aims or policies are: 
• To inflict economic damage on those who profit from the 
misery and exploitation of animals. 
• To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against 
animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent 
direct actions and liberations. 
• To take all necessary precautions against harming any 
human or non-human animal. (ALF 2005c) 
 
Group members engage in direct action in protest against facilities and 
laboratories engaged in what the group defines as abuse of animals.  Early ALF 
covert operations tended to focus on the “liberation” of animals from vivisection 
laboratories. However, in recent years these actions have expanded to include 
vandalism, arson, and making threats against individuals who directly or 
indirectly work for organizations the ALF has targeted. 
A more radical animal rights strain is evident in an undated interview with 
British ALF leader Robin Webb who said that anyone who is a vegetarian or 
vegan, and who carries out an action that falls within the polices of ALF, may 
claim that action on behalf of the ALF (No Compromise 2005).  He added "That is 
why the ALF cannot be smashed, it cannot be effectively infiltrated, it cannot be 
stopped. You, each and every one of you: you are the ALF” (No Compromise 
2005).  More ominously, Webb made references to the Animal Rights Militia 
(ARM) and the Justice Department (JD), radical groups described as “…the hard 
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cutting edge of the war against abuse and exploitation of the weak and innocent.” 
(No Compromise 2005).  The ARM clamied responsibility for six bomb attacks on 
the homes of scientists in 1985 (Monaghan 1997, 111).  Since its appearance in 
1993, the Justice Department has claimed responsibility for hundreds of violent 
attacks in the U.K. including letter bombs that have injured several people, and 
mailing scores of envelopes rigged with poisoned razor blades taped inside the 
opening edge of the envelopes, poised to cut the fingers of anyone opening the 
letters (Monaghan 1997, 110).   
In January 1996, after the group became active in North America, the JD 
claimed responsibility for sending envelopes with blades dipped in rat poison to 
80 researchers, hunting guides and others in British Columbia, Alberta and 
around the United States (SPLC 2002).  "Dear animal killing scum!" read the note 
inside, "Hope we sliced your finger wide open and that you now die from the rat 
poison we smeared on the razor blade."  The letter signed off, "Justice 
Department strikes again."  Authorities in Great Britain have suggested that Keith 
Mann of the ALF, currently serving an 11-year prison sentence in Britain, 
founded the JD (Mannes 2005). 
Some observers contend that groups like ARM and JD are not distinct 
groups, but merely invented names for non-existant groups that take 
responsibility for acts that are too violent to compy with ALF claims of “non 
violence to sentient beings” (Geldard 1989, 8; Henshaw 1989, 67). A 
communique issed by the JD highlights increased radicalization in the animal 
rights movment and the group’s willingness to use violence:  
We’ve sat back for years and watched (animal rights) activists ask 
nicely for all the abuse to stop – the more daring risk their lives and 
liberty but still the unacceptable number of tortured animals keep 
rising…We won’t be asking anyone to stop messing with animals 
and make no more excuses for our violentt intevention – they’ve 
had it too good for too long.  NO MORE TORTURE, NO MORE 
LIES. (Monaghan 1997, 112; emphasis in original) 
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Webb stated “Simply put, the third policy of the ALF (performing non-
violent direct actions) no longer applies" (No Compromise 2005).  This statement 
appears to confirm claims in law enforcement intelligence reports that the more 
extreme groups like ARM and JD are simply different names for the same groups 
of activists engaged in escalating violence that has begun to target individuals for 
attack. 
2. The ALF Path to Terrorist Violence 
Public statements by spokespersons for the ALF cite a growing demand 
by disenchanted members for the escalation of violence to include targeted 
violence towards individuals associated with corporations, government agencies 
and other entities viewed as contributing to animal abuse.  Webb has stated 
elsewhere that "The only difference between ALF and the more radical ones is 
that ALF basically takes every precaution not to endanger life at any time. The 
Animal Rights Militia are prepared to twist the arm of animal abusers" (BBC 
2000).  Critics also have noted a statement made by ALF first press officer and 
founder Ronnie Lee, who wrote that "[a]nimal liberation is a fierce struggle that 
demands total commitment. There will be injuries and possibly deaths on both 
sides. That is sad but certain" (BBC 2000).  When David Blenkinsop, together 
with two other men who remain unidentified, attacked Huntingdon Life Sciences 
director Brian Cass outside his home with pick-axe handles, ALF founder Ronnie 
Lee said “He has got off lightly. I have no sympathy for him" (Alleyne 2001).  
Robin Webb said of the attack: 
The Animal Liberation Front has always had a policy of not harming 
life, but while it would not condone what took place, it understands 
the anger and frustration that leads people to take this kind of 
action. (Alleyne 2001) 
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Grievance.  Grievances are evident via numerous open sources including 
Internet websites, interviews and news releases by ALF spokespersons.  They 
include opposition to corporations and laboratories supporting animal research, 
vivisection and a vast array of activities the group defines as animal abuse.  The 
ALF website displays this credo: 
The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) carries out direct action against 
animal abuse in the form of rescuing animals and causing financial 
loss to animal exploiters, usually through the damage and 
destruction of property.  Wide ranging grievances focus on acts 
defined by the group as animal abuse, including vivisection, an 
emotive term that refers to the dissection or surgery upon a living 
animal, typically for scientific investigation. (ALF 2005b)   
Animal rights groups apply it broadly to any type of experimentation in 
which animals are injured, with or without surgery.  ALF also cites the 
“maintenance or commodification” of animals for: 
…food, entertainment, cosmetics, clothing, scientific testing, or for 
any other reason, infringes upon their fundamental rights to 
possess themselves and to pursue their own ends (ALF 2005c). 
Citing extreme cases of abuse, ALF examples include research 
laboratories forcing animals to simulate sex acts while taking blood samples, 
screaming at animals in order to invalidate blood-pressure tests, punching 
puppies in the face (purpose not clear), sawing open the tops of primate skulls to 
induce stroke and then leaving them with their brains exposed and uncared for 
after the procedure for 15 hours overnight.  The animals were reportedly found 
dead the next morning (ALF 2005c). 
Farmers, demonized as “manipulative money grubbers” and “brutal, crude 
and merciless” do not escape the group’s wrath.  Citing husbandry practices, 
ALF states: 
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…hens exhaust themselves by laying so many eggs simply 
because their eggs are taken away from them.  Dairy cows are 
artificially inseminated. As soon as they give birth their calf is ripped 
away from them. Calves are kept chained in tiny stalls and fed on a 
chemical rich diet for veal production.  The mother's milk is sucked 
out along rubber tubes and sold by the massive dairy 
industry…farmers stuff (animals) into lorries and carry them for 
days without providing anything for them to eat or drink…cage them 
in tiny boxes, move them about soaked in their own urine and knee 
deep in their own excrement, scare them senseless and then slit 
their throats. (ALF 2005c) 
Ideation is evident in the process of splintering and radicalization from 
more mainstream groups, such as Earth First! and People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals.  Citing troubling internal rhetoric that increasingly is 
shifting towards targeted violence against individuals, the FBI fears a dramatic 
escalation in violence: 
Traditionally ALF freed lab and farm animals, insisting that they 
would never purposefully harm a human. But affiliated groups in 
Europe have beaten opponents, and Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn's 
assassin was an animal rights activist. (FBI 2004b) 
At an August 2003 Animal Rights Conference in Los Angeles ALF 
spokesman, Dr. Jerry Vlasak, stated: 
I think there is a use for violence in our movement. And I think it 
can be an effective strategy. Not only is it morally acceptable. … I 
don't think you'd have to kill -- assassinate -- too many vivisectors 
before you would see a marked decrease in the amount of 
vivisection going on. (FBI 2004b) 
There are indications that ALF and its sister group Earth Liberation Front 
(ELF) share an increasingly cozy ideological kinship with international terrorists 
(FBI 2004b).  Both groups have affiliates in Europe and connections to the 
radical left internationally. Daniel Andreas, who is on the FBI's most wanted list 
for a series of attempted bombings of animal research facilities, sent an e-mail 
claiming credit for the bombings that ended with a salute to international terrorists
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including Columbia's FARC, the Irish Republican Army, and the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, a group closely linked with the Islamist terrorist 
groups Hamas and Hezbollah (FBI 2004b).   
Research and Planning.  ALF tactics that include following corporate 
executives and surveilling their homes are evidence of Research and Planning.  
ALF members have obtained employment in offending laboratories to take 
pictures and video to document abuse and learn insider information necessary to 
circumvent alarms and other security measures.  The group also conducts 
extensive research to identify corporations and individuals associated with 
organizations that ALF perceives as major animal abusers such as Huntingdon 
Life Sciences (ALF 2005c).  Once identified, members follow corporate 
executives and surveil their homes, vehicles, family members and activities.    
Preparation.  Preparing how-to manuals on arson and other direct action 
methods designed to disrupt or destroy the ability of offending companies to 
continue operations and posting them on the Internet demonstrates preparation.  
The ALF manual “Arson Around with Auntie Alf” posted on ALF websites is a 
detailed and fairly sophisticated how-to manual detailing the construction and use 
of incendiary devices (ALF 2005a). 
Breech and Attack The ability of the group to set arson fires resulting in 
significant damage and conduct burglaries to liberate laboratory animals is 
evidence of ALF ability to breach security and perpetrate violence.   
3. Analysis  
The ability of ALF to inspire its followers to violence, and the success of 
the group in destroying property and generating publicity, has earned the ALF 
membership on the FBI’s list of domestic terror groups.  Its grievances stem from 
a well-honed and globe-spanning extremist animal rights ideology that overlaps 
and is supportive of other radical ideologies such as enviornmental extremism, 
green anarchy and other leftist ideologies (FBI 2004b).  The group is responsible 
for millions of dollars in damage and numerous sucessful attacks aimed at 
disrupting the operations of companies it views as animal abusers.  More 
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ominously, there are indications that more radical members, possibly forming 
splinter groups like ARM and JD, have targeted individuals for physical attack in 
an escalation of violence.   
Threat assessment using PTTV clearly indicates terrorist violence 
potential in the group’s stated grievances and its accompanying ideation of 
violence as a means to achieve group goals.  However, like other covert, 
clandestine organizations, especially those employing leaderless resistance, 
PTTV assessment is manifestly more difficult because of the group’s amorphous 
membership and the number and wide geographic dispersion of potential targets.   
C. GROUP THREE: CONTEMPORARY RIGHT WING GROUP 
1. The Army of God (AOG) 
The Army of God (AOG) is an extremist religious group that some argue is 
more a shared ideology than an organization (Altum 2003, 1).  Adherents have 
taken credit for the 1997 bombings of an Atlanta abortion clinic and a gay 
nightclub (Haught 1997).  After the second blast, a crude, unsigned letter was 
sent to the Reuters news agency.  The letter said “units of the Army of God” 
placed both bombs.  It said anyone involved with abortion "may become victims 
of retribution."  As for the gay nightclub, it said: "We will target sodomites, there 
(sic) organizations, and all those who push there (sic) agenda."  In militia-like 
tones, the letter threatened both the United Nations and the U.S. government: 
We declare and will wage total war on the ungodly communist 
regime in New York and your legislative (sic)-bureaucratic lackey's 
in Washington. It is you who are responsible and preside over the 
murder of children and issue the policy of ungodly perversion (sic) 
thats (sic) destroying our people....Death to the New World Orer 
(sic). (Haught 1997) 
Eric Rudolph, an Army of God follower, is suspected of planting the nail-
studded bomb that killed a woman and hurt 100 others at the Atlanta Olympics in 
1998, as well as the two bombings in Atlanta described above (MIPT 2005).  He 
is currently serving two life sentences for the Birmingham bombings.   
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The origins of the group are traced to the early 1980s when 
fundamentalist protesters repeatedly swarmed5 an abortion clinic in Granite City, 
IL.  The clinic operator, Dr. Hector Zevallos, and his wife Rosalee were 
kidnapped by a group of men calling themselves the Army of God (Haught 2005).  
The couple was held eight days in an abandoned ammunition bunker and 
threatened by their captors with death if Dr. Zevallos did not pledge to stop 
performing abortions.  He did, and the couple was released.  Three men later 
were convicted of the kidnapping.  The leader, Don Benny Anderson, said God 
had told him to wage war against abortion.  Anderson was sentenced to a 30-
year prison term and also was convicted of arson fires at two Florida abortion 
clinics that netted a second 30-year term (Haught 2005).  
Followers of AOG’s radical ideology believe that their call to action comes 
directly from God and therefore supercedes American law and jurisprudence.  It 
promotes the doctrine of “justifiable homicide” that allows the killing of abortion 
providers in defense of innocent lives (Altum 2003, 2).  Pastor Michael Bray is 
the self-proclaimed chaplain of the Army of God.  He hosts the annual White 
Rose Banquet honoring those imprisoned for anti-abortion violence.  He also 
wrote the book "A Time to Kill" which provides a biblical justification for the use of 
violence against abortion providers.  Bray has served time in jail for bombing 
abortion clinics and he named his daughter after a murderer of an abortion doctor 
(Haught 2005).  
The anonymously written Army of God manual contains detailed 
instructions for abortion clinic violence including tactics to blockade entrances, 
attack with butyric acid, firebombing and using improvised explosive devices 
(Altum 2003, 4).  The manual contains anti-abortion language as well as anti-
government and anti-gay/lesbian language. It begins with a declaration of war on 
the abortion industry: 
 
5. Swarming is a law enforcement term used to describe protest group activities directed at disrupting 
traffic flow or halting operations by flooding an intersection, street or abortion clinic with a large number 
of protestors.   
43 
Our Most Dread Sovereign Lord God requires that whosoever 
sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. Not out of 
hatred of you, but out of love for the persons you exterminate, we 
are forced to take arms against you. Our life for yours - a simple 
equation....You shall not be tortured at our hands. Vengeance 
belongs to God only. However, execution is rarely gentle. (MIPT 
2005) 
Army of God member James Kopp was convicted in the fatal shooting of 
clinic doctor Dr. Barnett Slepian in 1998.  Kopp is suspected of six or more 
similar shootings between 1994 and 1997.  Clayton Wagner, the man who 
claimed responsibility for sending over 550 anthrax threat letters to clinics in 
2001, signed many of his letters with the name “Army of God.”  He also posted 
threats on the Army of God website to kill 42 individuals working at abortion 
clinics (Reiter 2000, 120). 
In March 1993, Michael Griffen assassinated Dr. David Gunn.  Inspired by 
this murder, Oregon housewife Rachelle Shannon corresponded with Griffen 
several times and eventually decided to become an assassin herself.  The 
routine monitoring of prison correspondence would have provided indications of 
radical ideation that might have established the requisite criminal predicate 
necessary for more intrusive criminal intelligence targeting of Shannon to 
determine her threat potential. If so, police might have discovered her research, 
planning and preparations leading to her decision to assassinate Dr. George 
Tiller of Wichita, Kansas.  On August 19, 1993 Shannon waited outside Tiller's 
clinic.  As he left work for the day, she approached his car and fired her pistol 
seriously wounding him (Calhoun 2001, 92).  She later bragged that she was 
enforcing "God's will."  Buried in Shannon's back yard, police found an AOG 
manual filled with bomb-making instructions and a “Declaration" saying abortion 
providers must be assassinated: 
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We, the undersigned, declare the justice of taking all godly action 
necessary to defend innocent human life including the use of force.  
We proclaim that whatever force is legitimate to defend the life of a 
born child is legitimate to defend the life of an unborn child. We 
assert that if Michael Griffin did in fact kill David Gunn, his use of 
lethal force was justifiable provided it was carried out for the 
purpose of defending the lives of unborn children. Therefore, he 
ought to be acquitted of the charges against him. (O’Boyle 2002, 
35) 
Other actions by AOG followers include the killing of abortion provider Dr. 
John Britton and his driver James Barrett outside a Pensacola, Florida abortion 
clinic.  Paul Hill, a former Presbyterian minister and anti-abortion activist, killed 
Britton on July 29, 1994 (Mason 2000b, 39).  In addition to the two murders, Hill 
wounded Barrett’s wife.  During his trial, the judge refused to allow Hill to explain 
to the jury his justifiable homicide rationale for taking action.  Sentenced to the 
death penalty under Florida law, Hill was executed by lethal injection making him 
the first person to be executed in the U.S. for killing an abortionist. 
Paul Hill's actions in 1994 were part of a wave of anti-abortion violence 
committed by AOG followers; Michael Griffin was serving a life sentence for the 
murder of an abortion provider; James Kopp was in prison for killing a physician 
in Buffalo, New York; Eric Rudolph was awaiting trial for a 1998 bombing that 
killed a police officer at an Alabama abortion clinic; John Salvi had committed 
suicide in prison two years after the 1994 killing of two abortion clinic 
receptionists in Massachusetts (Clarkson 1998).  In a statement before his 
execution, Hill said that he felt no remorse for his actions and that he expected "a 
great reward in Heaven" (Hill, 1999). 
2. The AOG Path to Terrorist Violence 
Prior to targeting abortion providers for assasination, observers of the pro-
life movement detected several trends that indicated a shift from protest to 
increasingly violent forms of terrorism (Mason 2000a, 14).  Pro-life assasins no 
longer fit the “religious martyr” mold; instead of confronting abortion providers 
face to face, as Michael Griffen had done when killing David Gunn, attacks 
evolved to anonymous snipers shooting from hidden locations and from the 
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bombing of clinics to the use of secondary devices - explosives studded with 
shrapnel like ball bearings and nails designed to injure and maim and timed to 
detonate after the arrival of first responders (Mason 2000a, 14). 
Grievance – Evidence of grievance includes numerous publications like 
the underground manuals, “Firestorm: A Guerrilla Strategy for Pro-Life America” 
and “A Time to Kill” that provides a bibilical justification for the use of violence 
against abortion providers (Clarkson 1998).  These publications, and Internet 
postings supporting the AOG doctrine of justifiable homicide, indicate the depth 
of their grievances.  All espouse a radical pro-life ideology that legitimates an 
end-justifes-the-means rationale for violence to stop abortions using tactics that 
disrupt abortion practices through arson, vandalism, confrontation, stalking 
harassment and murder.   
Ideation – Evidence of ideation includes numerous AOG websites that 
support pro-life violence.  Typical of this phenonoma was the original 
Numremburg Files (NF) website that listed attacks on abortion providers as well 
as detailed information on their residences and clinic addresses. The NF 
asserted that abortion doctors should be brought to trial as Nazi war criminals 
were after World War II (FMF 1999).  The website maintained a list of abortion 
providers with different fonts indicating the status of violence directed at them.  A 
gray font indicated wounded doctors while murdered doctors were marked with a 
strike through.  For several of the people listed, the site also included 
photographs, home and work addresses, phone numbers, and other information 
useful for planning an attack.  
Other sources of ideation include the annual White Rose Banquet (WRB)  
honoring imprisoned followers of AOG violence (FMF 2001).  The activities at the 
2001 WRB are indicative of AOG ideation.  The banquet is celebrated on the eve 
of the anniversary of the right to abortion decision, Roe v. Wade.6  In 2001 the 
host, and convicted clinic bomber Michael Bray, was honored by several dozen 
persons from across the country including convicted arsonists, bombers, and 
                                            
6. Roe v. Wade - 410 U.S. 113, January 17, 1973. 
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others previously convicted for anti abortion violence (FMF, 2001).  Many of those 
attending had signed their names to “Defensive Action” petitions that justify the 
use of force, including murder, against abortion providers.  Featured conference 
speakers at the 2001 banquet included Neal Horsley from suburban Atlanta, 
creator of the infamous Nuremberg Files.  Michael Bray was presented symbolic 
gifts from those in attendance including a gasoline can and a road flare 
symbolizing AOG support of Bray’s arson attacks (FMF, 2001).
Research and Planning –  The ability of AOG followers to kidnap and hold 
an abortion provider and his wife hostage, to assassinate other abortion 
providers, and to commit a range of geographically dispersed and varied type of 
attacks highlights the group’s ability to conduct research and formulate plans for 
violence. 
Preparation –  Publishing numerous how-to manuals that detail how to 
commit arson and vandalism attacks against abortion clinics, as well group ability 
to conduct kidnappings and sniper attacks, indicate that AOG followers can meet 
the logistical needs of mounting an array of attacks on widely dispersed targets.  
In addition, drafting treatises citing bibilical sources for the justifiable homicide 
doctrine are part of a sophisticated psychological process to prepare members to 
move from ideation to action in attacking abortion clinic workers. 
Breach & Attack - The ability of AOG followers to bypass security to 
kidnap an abortion provider and his wife, to assassinate other abortion providers, 
as well as damaging abortion clinics by arson and vandalism, are evidence of the 
group’s ability to successfully breach security and perpetrate violence.   
3. Analysis 
The PTTV analysis of the AOG proves to be a valid threat assessment 
model clearly indicating the potential for violence evident in the Grievance and 
Ideation stages.  Threat assessment of AOG documents, manuals, Internet 
postings and public statements clearly indicate a deeply emotional and 
substantial Grievance centered on an extreme version of pro-life activism fueled 
by what followers view as religious or divine justification for violence including 
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murder.  There is clear ideation supporting terrorist violence including killing 
abortion providers, clinic workers and law enforcement officers by sniping and 
bombings.   
Typical of the vitriolic rhetoric supporting such acts are the character of 
websites like the Nuremberg Files (FMF1999).  The Nuremberg Files, before 
being shut down by court order for inciting violence against abortion providers, 
contained numerous inflammatory statements such as, “Our goal is to record the 
name of every person working in the baby slaughter business across the United 
States of America.”  In addition to listing abortionists with a legend indicating the 
status of violence directed at them, there was a link to additional pages 
accompanied by the phrase ”Click Here If You Need Pictures To Remind You 
Why These People Must Be Brought To Justice.”  Clicking on the link opened a 
new page containing graphic photographs of aborted fetuses, biblical quotes and 
emotional supporting commentary, such as “This is what God's Child Looks Like 
Before the Baby Butchers Begin Their Deadly Business” (Nuremberg Files n.d.). 
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of PTTV analysis are robust in identifying terrorism potential in 
all three groups in the Grievance and Ideation stages.  Retrospective analysis of 
the groups clearly indicates that they were at risk of escalation via significant and 
deep-seated Grievances and Ideation supporting movement towards terrorist 
violence.  The evolution of future members of the SLA from prison militancy and 
other forms of relatively benign leftist social activism to violent terror group is 
clearly indicated in grievances and ideation that hinted at, and sometimes 
blatantly decried, violent revolutionary tendencies.  The ALF appears to be 
undergoing increased radicalization and splintering to form more extreme 
factions supporting the targeting of individuals.  This escalation is clearly 
indicated in ideation supporting such violence and in physical attacks on 
opponents including a murder in Europe reportedly linked to an ALF-related 
group (FBI 2004b).  AOG terrorist tendencies also are evident in numerous 
Internet posts and doctrines supporting violence targeting abortion providers.   
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The use of leaderless resistance by both AOG and ALF appears to be an 
increasingly common thread linking a wide range of contemporary radical groups 
from white supremacists to extremist animal and environmental groups.  When it 
appears, especially in combination with other factors indicative of terrorist 
violence potential, leaderless resistance may be a strong indicator of a group 
reaching Step Four - Preparation on the PTTV.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Validity and reliability are the ultimate measure of the efficacy of a threat 
assessment model.  Validity refers to the degree to which the assessment model 
measures what it claims to measure.  Reliability refers to the degree to which the 
model is consistent in measuring what it is intended to measure.  Validity is 
requisite to reliability: If an assessment model is not valid, there is no point in 
discussing reliability because validity is required before reliability can be 
considered in any meaningful way.  Similarly, if a model is not reliable it is also 
not valid (OPTISM 2005). 
For the three groups examined, the PTTV is a valid threat assessment 
model.  The PTTV benefits from its simple, easy to grasp concepts while 
avoiding the morass of contentious, conceptually messy and unreliable 
psychosocial, religious, race or ethnicity-based profiling assumptions.  The model 
indicates terrorist violence potential by determining where on the PTTV a group 
is located based on an examination of group grievances, ideation and actions 
necessary to mount an attack.   
There is a distinction between the significance of a grievance standing 
alone and a grievance in combination with ideation supporting terrorist violence.  
Grievances are inherent in the pluralist nature of American society.  They are the 
catalyst for forming most legitimate social movements.  The significance of a 
grievance to a mainstream social movement differs from that of the same 
grievance to a pre-terrorist group because the former accepts non-terrorist 
ideation supporting legitimate social change methods like participation in the 
political process, debate, protest and civil disobedience, while the latter - often a 
radical splintered-off subgroup - embraces ideation revolving around terrorist 
violence.  In many cases grievances, by themselves, are not a strong indicator of 
terrorist violence potential.  However, the existence of grievances can be a 
significant indicator when there is a nexus between them and ideation embracing 
terrorist violation. 
50 
The actions of Army of God follower, Rachelle Shannon, illustrate the 
validity of the PTTV model.  Shannon began her anti-abortion activities by 
attending demonstrations and reading pro-life propaganda.  In Shannon’s case, 
her anti-abortion actions imply a grievance (Step One-Grievance).  Several 
months later she was convicted of multiple arson fires at abortion clinics.  In 
March 1993, Michael Griffen assassinated abortion provider Dr. David Gunn.  
Shannon wrote Griffen several times (Step Two-Ideation) and was inspired7 to 
become an assassin herself (Calhoun 2001, 91-92).  Her research on prominent 
abortion providers led her to choose Dr. George Tiller of Wichita, Kansas (Step 
Three-Research and Planning).  Raising money through bake sales, Shannon 
earned enough money to buy a pistol and a plane ticket to Wichita (Step Four-
Preparation).  On August 19th 1993, Shannon waited outside Tiller's clinic until 
the doctor left work at the end of the day (Step Five-Breach).  Shannon 
approached Tiller’s car and fired her gun seriously wounding the doctor (Step 
Six-Attack).  
The reliability of the PTTV model is evident in its ability to accurately 
assess terrorist violence potential for three radical groups representing a wide 
spectrum of ideologies.  The strength of the model stems from the fact that all 
forms of targeted violence must follow the path in its entirety before violence can 
occur.  The Rachelle Shannon case underscores the impact of removing any of 
the steps on the PTTV.  If Shannon did not have a Grievance stemming from the 
inability of the pro-life movement to stop abortions she would not have a motive 
or need to seek redress via Ideation that violence was an acceptable solution.  
Shannon failed in less violent attempts – including setting arson fires at abortion 
clinics - to alleviate the Grievance.  Her lack of success to ameliorate a deeply 
held and religiously influenced grievance led her to consider escalated violence.  
When lesser forms of violence failed to stop abortions, Shannon chose the 
ultimate form of violence by attempting to murder an abortion provider. 
                                            
7. Evidence of Shannon’s ideation is based on her comments during interviews by Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents following her arrest (Calhoun 2001, 100). 
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The influence of AOG ideology and the apparent success of violence by 
other AOG members led Shannon to embrace Ideation supporting murder.  The 
culmination of the Ideation process led her to translate thoughts of violence into 
actions to address her Grievance.  Shannon took the next step on the PTTV, 
Research and Planning, by studying the attacks of other AOG members.  Ready 
to imitate these attacks, she continued research and planning by choosing an 
appropriate target.  At any point on the PTTV Shannon could have retreated from 
violence by abandoning Research and Planning.  Instead, she took the next step 
and began Preparation to commit her attack.  Holding bake sales to raise money 
to buy a gun and pay for plane fare are essential acts in transforming Shannon 
from a person contemplating violence to an armed assailant. 
Assume that Shannon changed her mind and decided not to try to kill Dr. 
Teller.  If, after purchasing the gun, she decided not to continue on the PTTV and 
sold the gun, threw it away, or put it in a drawer, Step Six, Attack, could not 
occur.  Similarly, if Shannon was unable to complete her Preparation due to 
illness, accident, or incapacitation due to an arrest for arson, the attack could not 
occur.  If Shannon had been unable to make the trip to Wichita from her home in 
Oregon, the Breach and Attack steps could not occur preventing the culmination 
of her trip on the PTTV.  Instead, Shannon was motivated by her AOG beliefs to 
commit the attack by taking the requisite step to Breach by approaching the clinic 
where Dr. Teller worked.  When Teller approached his car after work, Shannon 
shot and wounded him to complete her trek on the Path to Terrorist Violence.  
Similarly, if Shannon had failed to Attack due to the presence of armed security, 
innocent bystanders, or because she was not able to pull the trigger out of moral 
conviction, the Attack could not occur – at least for the moment.  Obviously, 
removing any step prevents the culmination of the trip on the PTTV.  
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A. THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR THE PATH TO TERRORIST 
VIOLENCE 
The theory that political violence, including terrorism, is a potential 
consequence of a faltering social movement leading to the development of a 
revolutionary dimension is widely accepted (Crenshaw 1972, 383; Weinberg and 
Eubank 1990, 140; Gentry 2004, 275; Laqueur 1997, 47; Gurr 1998, 87).  The 
revolutionary dimension follows factionalism as the social movement begins to 
fragment along ideological lines over disagreements about what methods to 
employ to achieve group goals.  A group’s increasing radicalization oftentimes is 
reflected in the tone and content of its open source communications.  The nature 
of intended violence, including the essential pre-conditions of premeditation and 
planning, make it theoretically detectable and therefore amenable to threat 
assessment.   
There is substantial theoretical support for the PTTV, especially the utility 
of using Step One - Grievance and Step Two - Ideation to identify terrorist 
violence tendencies while still in an inchoate stage.  Three studies in particular 
support the validity of threat assessment that focuses on the Grievance and 
Ideation stages.   
1. Sprinzak - Crisis of Legitimacy 
The Crisis of Legitimacy theory clarifies the importance of ideation in 
identifying groups progressing towards terrorist violence (Sprinzak 1991, 50).  
This process includes language that de-legitimizes the regime; rhetoric that 
depersonalizes and dehumanizes opponents; acts of intended violence and 
terrorism.  By rejecting a government’s legitimacy, radical groups experience a 
crisis of legitimacy that leads them to challenge it with unconventional violence 
(Sprinzak 1991, 50).  The importance of Sprinzak’s model in understanding the 
context of radical group ideation is that the first external indication of group 
evolution to violence, and perhaps the most significant for threat assessment 
purposes, is often linguistic (1991, 57).  Crenshaw underscores the importance of 
language as an indicator of potential terrorist violence  (1998, 277): 
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…attention should be paid to the words that terrorists issue -
memoirs, pronouncements, rationales.  Although these words may 
be self-serving, that does not mean that they are not also, in some 
significant way, revealing. 
2. Smith - Value References in Group Rhetoric 
Research supports the validity of analyzing value references in group 
rhetoric via open source documents to determine terrorist violence potential 
(Smith 2004, 416).  Value references in group rhetoric stemming from grievance 
and reflecting ideation of violence reliably indicated terrorist violence potential 
(Smith 2004, 411).  The morality value was a significant indicator; groups that 
view themselves as morally superior to others are more likely to engage in 
violence (Smith 2004, 418).  Groups that see themselves as a morally superior 
elite feel entitled to disregard conventional standards of behavior including the 
ability to justify using civilians as pawns in the struggle against their enemies 
(Smith 2004, 414).  The ability to identify moral superiority exists in Internet 
postings, group websites, communiqués, press releases, interviews, doctrines 
and other open source material.   
3. Post, Ruby and Shaw - Integrated Analysis Approach 
The PTTV Model meshes well with a framework for analyzing the risk of 
violence associated with radical groups formulated by Post, Ruby and Shaw 
(2002, 73). Their integrated approach, based on the feedback of leading 
terrorism experts, provides indicators of a shift towards terrorist violence 
associated with a specified set of variables that can be applied to the analysis of 
radical groups.  By interweaving various threat indicators in a socio-political 
context and comparing them to what experts view as significant indicators of 
transition to escalated violence, their approach lends itself to threat assessments 
of groups at risk.   When available evidence concerning the SLA, ALF and AOG 
is applied to this framework, it reveals the existence of several ideological, 
psychological and behavioral indicators suggesting escalated risk of violence 
(Ackerman 2004, 146). 
Post, Ruby and Shaw (2002, 74) identified thirty-four variables in four 
major categories: (1) Historical, Cultural and Contextual Variables; (2) Key Actors 
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Affecting the Group; (3) Group Characteristics, and: (4) Situational/Environmental 
conditions affecting the group (Post, et al. 2002, 76).  Group characteristics, 
processes and structures, many identifiable via open sources, were the ultimate 
indicators of movement towards terrorist violence expressed in ideology and 
experience with violence (Post, et al. 2002, 84).  The recruitment, selection, 
socialization, training, assignment, promotion and attrition of group members are 
tell-tale indicators of group motivations and orientation.  In the case of the SLA, 
the infusion of escaped convict Donald De Freeze’s violent criminal expertise 
transformed the rhetoric of the white, middle class SLA core to violent action that 
included kidnapping, assaults, bombings, robbery and assassination.  Similarly, 
the training at ALF camps in Britain includes training supporters in how to kill 
(Nugent, 2004).  Observers report that spokespersons for ALF advocated using 
tactics such as “delivering short punches to key areas” and to “aim for the eyes, 
nose, the neck and the kidneys” to attack the staff of companies and suppliers 
involved in vivisection (Nugent 2004). 
While supporting PTTV concepts, this approach is encumbered by the 
large number of variables and the significant amount of information necessary for 
threat assessment.  The covert nature of pre-terrorist and terrorist groups adds to 
the difficulty of collecting such information, especially for time-sensitive threat 
assessments involving late discovery of a group’s violent tendencies.  The time 
required gathering and analyzing historical, cultural and contextual variables, 
identifying key actors and their influence on the group, group characteristics and 
situational or environmental conditions makes this method better suited for 
academic research and less time-sensitive applications.  By contrast, the PTTV 
construct is conceptually cleaner and easier to use by relying on six easy to 
observe variables that can be applied by a wide range of users from criminal 
intelligence analysts to researchers, from law enforcement executives to cops on 
the beat and operational or tactical decision makers.   
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B. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH 
There are obvious limitations imposed by the scope of this research, 
notably the lack of comparison with control groups from the same time period 
and ideology that did not pursue terrorist violence.  It is reasonable to ask 
whether a valid and reliable study of the PTTV is possible without a control group 
or larger sample.  The importance of non-terrorist groups as controls is 
highlighted by Crenshaw (1995, 5): 
Rather than look at a dozen cases where terrorism developed, 
perhaps we should look at similar backgrounds and compare those 
cases where terrorism emerged with those where it did not. 
Comparing groups embracing terrorist violence with similar groups that did 
not would undoubtedly strengthen the analysis.  Future directions in threat 
assessment research would benefit from such comparison as well as analysis of 
within movement differences that highlights the factors present in radical splinter 
groups choosing violence and absent in those following more conventional, 
restrained methods. 
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The PTTV was never envisioned as a stand-alone threat assessment tool.  
Instead, when used to support and enhance other methods, such as Intelligence-
Led Policing (ILP) and the Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing (ASAP) 
schema, PTTV may yield a synergistic improvement in the accuracy, reliability 
and speed of threat assessments. 
1. Support of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) 
PTTV assessment meshes well with the emphasis on Intelligence-Led 
Policing (ILP)8 as a counter terrorism tool: 
To adequately assess the threats from a terrorist group, information 
[gathered via Intelligence-Led Policing] is needed for a 
comprehensive analysis.  Oftentimes…critical information is 
missing that prevents a complete and accurate [threat] assessment 
…(Carter 2001, 4) 
 
8. Intelligence-Led Policing – “…the application of criminal intelligence analysis as a rigorous 
decision making tool to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels to facilitate 
crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies” (Carter 2001, vi ). 
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Any method that helps fill in this missing information, either through direct 
knowledge or informed estimate, can potentially yield an exponential increase in 
the ability to identify terrorist violence potential.  The importance of supporting 
ILP with threat-driven assessment models is underscored by this observation: 
New expectations and responsibilities are being placed on law 
enforcement agencies…to develop an intelligence capacity as part 
of a cohesive national strategy to protect the United States from 
terrorism…particularly after the events of September 11, 2001…the 
intelligence process is threat-driven with the intent of preventing a 
terrorist act… (Carter 2004, vii) 
Identifying domestic terrorist violence potential using the PTTV model 
accomplishes several complementary goals supporting ILP.  First, it minimizes 
the expenditure of finite law enforcement resources on unnecessary 
investigations of groups not posing a threat.  Second, related to the first goal, it 
minimizes the potential chilling effect on, and infringement of, constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of association, expression and dissenting political activity 
caused by unwarranted law enforcement investigation and disruption of benign 
groups. Third, in many cases, PTTV analysis can be accomplished using open 
sources.  Open source information often yields radical group grievances and 
ideation – all potentially useful indicators in PTTV assessment.  The use of open 
sources is non-intrusive and does not violate restrictions on criminal intelligence 
activities because such information is public domain.  
2. Integration with other Methodologies: Atypical Signal Analysis 
and Processing (ASAP) 
The effectiveness of the PTTV Model is enhanced when it is used as part 
of a comprehensive threat assessment process to provide useful data for 
intelligence analysis.  The potential synergy of PTTV analysis in concert with 
other approaches, such as the Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing (ASAP) 
schema, may yield quicker, more accurate assessments.  ASAP is based on the 
idea that studying atypical, out-of-the-ordinary signals that deviate significantly 
from the status quo can identify terrorism planning and preparations before an 
attack occurs (Hollywood et al. 2004, 44).  The PTTV Model enhances the 
57 
                                           
identification of these deviations, or critical warning signs, by separating them 
from background “noise.”9  The PTTV model can feed the intelligence 
assessment process by identifying warning signs, and the context that helps 
explain them, from amid the clutter of intelligence noise (Hollywood et al. 2004, 
44): 
Every day, the intelligence community receives huge amounts of 
data…countless unsystematic “dots” of information. Yet with few 
clues about which data from this enormous flow are related to 
possible terrorist activity, great uncertainties about what the data 
mean, and little indication of how to put all the information together, 
the community can easily miss critical warning signs. 
Models of expected behavior, like the PTTV Model, help analysts make 
sense of the information traces left by groups exhibiting terrorist violence 
potential.  These traces describe highly atypical behavior as part of their attack 
preparations and some may indicate a change in operational status or the 
initiation of a threat (Hollywood et al. 2004, 44).  The PTTV Model can help 
detect threatening behavior, isolate it from the glut of information, add clarity and 





















9. For an interesting take on the problem of noise in counter terrorism intelligence, see Lake, “Al 
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